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The Impact of Different Types of Expert Scientifi c 
Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Liability Verdicts
Brian H. Bornstein
Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Abstract: Participants in two experiments acted as jurors for a personal-injury case containing dif-
ferent types of expert testimony. In both experiments, the defendant was more likely to obtain a ver-
dict in his favor when his expert presented anecdotal case histories than when the expert presented 
experimental data. Participants’ liability judgments were correlated with their perceptions of the ex-
perts’ credibility (experiments 1 and 2) and were moderated somewhat by their need for cognition 
and preference for numerical information (experiment 2). The results are discussed in terms of rea-
soning heuristics such as the base-rate fallacy. 
Keywords: Liability, Juror Decision Making, Expert Testimony 
INTRODUCTION 
Expert testimony has become increasingly common in both civil and criminal trials 
(Gross, 1991; Landsman, 1995; Faigman et al., 1997; Faigman, 1999). For example, in a 
review of 529 civil trials, Gross and Syverud (1991) found that 86% utilized expert testi-
mony. In some areas of civil law, such as products liability and medical malpractice, ex-
pert testimony is now virtually ubiquitous (Gross, 1991; Gross and Syverud, 1991). Rule 
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defi nes expert testimony as the “scientifi c, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge” of “a witness qualifi ed as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education.” Such testimony is admissible if it is reliable, 
would help the trier of fact decide the case correctly, and if the subject matter is beyond 
lay comprehension. 
The matter of whether expert testimony is relevant in a particular case is left to judicial 
discretion. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding the admissibility standard for 
scientifi c (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993; General Electric Co. v. Join-
er, 1997 ) and technical evidence (Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 1999 ) eliminated gener-
al acceptance in the fi eld as the sole requirement (Faigman, 1995; Berger, 2000; Gatows-
ki et al., 2001). Instead, the courts themselves must act as “gatekeepers” in determining 
whether the evidence was derived by scientifi cally valid research methods. Consequent-
ly, the courts are scrutinizing scientifi c evidence more closely than in the past, with the re-
sult that the standard is looser for some evidence yet stricter for other evidence (Faigman, 
1995, 1999; Gatowski et al., 2001). 
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A key issue in debating the appropriateness of any expert testimony is determining the 
effect that it is likely to have. Most psychological research on expert testimony has, not 
surprisingly, focused on the employment of psychological expertise (e.g. Faust and Ziskin, 
1988; Saks, 1992; Faigman et al., 1997). To a lesser extent, researchers have also investi-
gated the effects on jurors of non-psychological expert testimony (McAuliff et al., 2003). 
In civil cases, medical experts providing clinical opinion testimony on individual cases ap-
pear to be the prototype (Landsman, 1995). In Gross’s (1991; Gross and Syverud, 1991) 
review of California civil cases, half of the expert witnesses were medical doctors, 9% 
were other medical professionals (e.g. clinical psychologists, dentists), 20% were engi-
neers and other scientists, 11% were fi nancial or business experts, and 8% were experts in 
reconstruction and investigation. Thus, in at least one state, the emphasis on psychological 
expert witnesses that exists in the psychological literature does not accurately refl ect the 
proportion of mental health experts among the expert population as a whole. 
In criminal cases, one of the more common types of expert testimony is testimony about 
probabilistic incidence rates (Fienberg, 1989). As forensic science and other technologi-
cal disciplines become ever more sophisticated, such evidence (e.g. DNA matching, sta-
tistical evidence of discrimination, epidemiological data in toxic tort cases) has been, and 
is likely to continue to be, on the rise at trial (Fienberg, 1989; Faigman, 2000). Loftus 
(1980) showed that mock jurors underweigh such abstract, scientifi c testimony, especial-
ly compared to highly salient, individuating information such as an eyewitness identifi ca-
tion. This fi nding is consistent with several studies that have found that mock jurors are re-
luctant to base verdicts on statistical evidence alone (e.g. Niedermeier et al., 1999), under-
utilize expert probabilistic testimony compared to Bayesian norms (Faigman and Baglioni, 
1988; Kaye and Koehler, 1991; Koehler, 1992), and are infl uenced by how that testimony 
is presented (Thompson and Schumann, 1987; Cooper et al., 1996; Koehler, 2001). More 
generally, it refl ects people’s tendency to attend preferentially to anecdotal information and 
to underweigh summary base rates (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Borgida and Brekke, 
1981; Stanovich and West, 1998). 
Base rates can be defi ned as the “relative frequency with which an event occurs or an at-
tribute is present in a population” (Koehler, 1996, p. 16). For example, evidence that 10% 
of the population shares a criminal defendant’s blood type, which was found at the scene 
of a crime, would constitute a base rate relevant to the fact-in-issue of whether the defen-
dant was present at the scene. Although people tend to be insensitive to base rates, they are 
incorporated into predictive judgments to a greater extent if their relevance to the task at 
hand is made more salient (Borgida and Brekke, 1981; Kruglanski et al., 1984; Koehler, 
1996), as by highlighting the causal relationship between the base rate and the predicted 
criterion (Ajzen, 1977; Tversky and Kahneman, 1980). 
This general pattern appears to hold true for the effectiveness of different types of ex-
pert testimony in the trial context. For example, Schuller (1992) has distinguished be-
tween “general expert” testimony, which summarizes research fi ndings that are only in-
directly relevant to the particular case at hand, and “specifi c expert” testimony, which ex-
plicitly links the background research to the case under current consideration. This dis-
tinction is not the same as the base-rate/anecdotal distinction, but they are analogous in 
contrasting general background with case-specifi c evidence. The general testimony can 
be thought of as providing base-rate information, while specifi c testimony provides more 
individuating information. Consistent with research on the base-rate fallacy, expert psy-
chological testimony is more infl uential when it provides a concrete example of how the 
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relevant body of research is linked to the case at hand than when it merely summarizes 
abstract research fi ndings (Schuller, 1992; Gabora et al., 1993; Kovera et al., 1994, 1997; 
Krauss and Sales, 2001). 
Several studies have found that mock jurors are sensitive to variations in the content of 
scientifi c evidence (Brekke et al., 1991; Koehler, 2001, experiment 3; Smith et al., 1996). 
For example, Smith et al. presented mock jurors with a videotape of a simulated rape trial, 
in which an expert forensic serologist testifi ed regarding crucial blood-and enzyme-type 
evidence. Participants who were told that 20% of the population had an enzyme type that 
was shared by the assailant and the defendant judged the defendant as more guilty than 
participants who learned that 80% of the population had the same enzyme type. On the 
other hand, Kovera et al. (1999) found that mock jurors were not sensitive to more subtle 
manipulations of expert testimony content. In a simulated hostile work environment case, 
they varied characteristics of the experimental methodology used in research described by 
the expert witness (i.e. the research’s general acceptance, ecological validity, and construct 
validity). Although these cues had some effect on mock jurors’ perceptions of the expert’s 
credibility, they exerted no effect on their verdicts. 
Thus, the fi ndings of previous research on jurors’ use of expert scientifi c testimony are 
somewhat mixed. On the one hand, they tend to underweigh such testimony compared to 
a normative, Bayesian standard (Thompson and Schumann, 1987; Faigman and Baglioni, 
1988; Kaye and Koehler, 1991; Smith et al., 1996), to be unaffected by research methodol-
ogy (Kovera et al., 1999), and to be infl uenced by how the evidence is presented (Thomp-
son and Schumann, 1987; Cooper et al., 1996; Koehler, 2001); yet, on the other hand, 
they are properly sensitive to variations in expert testimony’s probative value (Saks and 
Wissler, 1984; Brekke et al., 1991; Smith et al., 1996). 
One possible reason for these disparate fi ndings is variability in how individual jurors 
will respond to complex scientifi c testimony. Individual jurors naturally vary in their per-
sonal biases and the sophistication of their judgmental processes, and a variety of attitudes 
can infl uence jurors’ decisions (Kaplan, 1982; Graziano et al., 1990). In complex cases 
where scientifi c evidence is prominent, jurors’ attitudes and beliefs toward scientifi c re-
search and complex information (e.g. technical, statistical, medical, or other forms of ex-
pert testimony) are likely to be especially relevant. The goal of the present research was to 
explore the impact on mock jurors of different types of expert testimony, particularly for a 
case in which the expert testimony addressed the sole fact-in-issue. The research also as-
sessed the relationship between mock jurors’ attitudes toward scientifi c and complex infor-
mation and their evaluation of expert scientifi c testimony. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Prior research has shown that psychological experts are more infl uential when testifying 
about concrete cases than about general, impersonal research fi ndings (Schuller, 1992; 
Gabora et al., 1993; Kovera et al., 1994, 1997; Krauss and Sales, 2001), but a similar com-
parison has not been made with non-psychological expert testimony. The main comparison 
in the present experiment is between concrete and abstract testimony provided by a non-
psychological expert, testifying for the defense, in a personal-injury case revolving around 
the connection between ingestion of a potentially harmful substance and deleterious health 
effects. Specifi cally, the expert presents testimony that either focuses on individual cas-
es (“anecdotal” evidence) or summarizes abstract research fi ndings (“experimental” evi-
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dence). Because the experimental evidence is akin to base rates, it is predicted that the an-
ecdotal evidence would have a greater impact on mock jurors’ judgments. 
Experiment 1 also addressed the predicted insensitivity to base rates by including two 
additional variables that manipulated the content of the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, 
provided by a statistician. People’s statistical reasoning is subject to a number of short-
comings (e.g. Nisbett et al., 1983). In particular, they are typically not sensitive to sam-
ple size and fail to apply the law of large numbers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). If ju-
rors tend to be relatively uninfl uenced by general (i.e. non-case-specifi c) research fi nd-
ings, then they should not be affected by characteristics of the sample on which that re-
search is based. 
Sample characteristics were manipulated in two ways: fi rst, by varying the size of the 
sample used in the epidemiological research described by the plaintiff’s statistical expert; 
and second, by varying the frequency of occurrence, or incidence, of the target character-
istic under study. This type of evidence has become increasingly common, especially in 
products liability, toxic tort, and DNA matching cases (Cecil et al., 1991; Gross, 1991; 
Green, 1992; Koehler, 2001). It is predicted that despite the relevance of sampling charac-
teristics to the conclusions that can legitimately be drawn from scientifi c research, mock 
jurors’ tendency to underutilize base rates (e.g. Koehler, 1992) and to be insensitive to 
variations in scientifi c evidence quality (Kovera et al., 1999) would lead them to be insen-
sitive to variations in characteristics of the base-rate sample. Finally, mock jurors answered 
questions designed to measure their attitudes toward scientifi c research in general. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 152 undergraduates (38 males and 114 females) enrolled in psychology 
courses who received extra course credit. 
Materials and design 
The trial scenario was a one-page, single-spaced summary (540–575 words, depending on 
condition) of a lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleged that lead contained in refuse stored by 
a paint manufacturer had seeped into his well water and caused his 12-year-old son to de-
velop rheumatoid arthritis. The case was modifi ed from an actual lawsuit (Backes v. The 
Valspar Corporation, 1986) and contained a description of the plaintiff and defendant, the 
plaintiff’s claim (i.e. that drinking contaminated water caused the boy’s illness), and the 
known facts. For example, there was no dispute that “the lead content of the family’s well 
water was found to be higher than the level fi t for human consumption”, or that the lead 
came from the company’s waste products. The summary described the boy as having had 
several unsuccessful operations to relieve the arthritis in his hands and feet, great diffi culty 
walking and writing, and unremitting pain. The family sought compensation for the boy’s 
pain and suffering, medical costs, and lost future income. 
In such cases, the major, and often sole, issue at trial concerns causality (Green, 1992; 
Hart and Honore, 1985); hence the sole fact-in-issue in the present trial was whether the 
lead caused the boy’s arthritis. The summary informed participants that lead contributes to 
other health problems, such as learning disabilities, but that its role in causing arthritis had 
not yet been determined by the scientifi c community. Expert testimony offered by both the 
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plaintiff and the defendant addressed this key issue by focusing on whether lead in general 
is capable of causing arthritis. 
The nature of the expert testimony was manipulated by varying three factors, two con-
cerning the content of the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, and one concerning the type of de-
fendant’s expert (see Table 1). The plaintiff’s expert witness was a statistician who pre-
sented a comparison of the incidence of arthritis in two cities, one where the water sup-
ply was contaminated with lead, and one where it was not. One variable was the size of 
the sample on which the statistician’s fi ndings were based: in the small sample condition, 
each city contained 50,000 people, while in the large sample condition, each city con-
tained 500,000 people (“small” and “large” here are meant purely in relative terms). A sec-
ond variable within the statistician’s testimony was the number of people who had the dis-
ease. In the high incidence condition, 40 people per 10,000 in the city exposed to lead-con-
taminated water had arthritis (i.e. 200/50,000 or 2,000/500,000); in the low incidence con-
dition, eight people per 10,000 in the city exposed to lead-contaminated water had arthri-
tis (i.e. 40/50,000 or 400/500,000). Thus, the incidence of arthritis was fi ve times great-
er in the high incidence than in the low incidence condition. The ratio of arthritis cases in 
the exposed sample, compared to the non-exposed sample, was held constant across condi-
tions at approximately 3:1. This ratio was the basis of the plaintiff’s expert’s conclusion (in 
all conditions) that exposure to lead increased the risk of arthritis. 
The third variable was the type of expert witness called by the defense. The defendant’s 
expert witness was either a scientist presenting experimental fi ndings from laboratory re-
search on animals (experimental condition), or a doctor presenting anecdotal evidence 
from three case histories (anecdotal condition). The defendant’s expert always concluded 
that lead does not increase the risk of developing arthritis (see Table 1). 
The design was therefore a 2 (Size of plaintiff’s expert’s sample: large vs small) × 2 (In-
cidence of arthritis in plaintiff’s expert’s sample: high vs low) × 2 (Type of defense expert: 
experimental vs anecdotal) between-groups design, with 19 participants per condition. 
TABLE 1 Examples of expert testimony. Italicized fi gures were altered depending on condition. Alter-
native versions of the expert testimony are described in the text. 
Epidemiological Evidence (for Plaintiff; small sample/low incidence condition). [The witness] com-
pared people in two cities from the same state, each with a population of about 50,000 people: one 
whose water supply had an unusually high level of lead, and one whose water supply did not. Approxi-
mately 40 children in the city with lead-contaminated water had arthritis, while only 13 in the city with 
lead-free water did. He concludes that exposure to lead poses a substantial health risk, particularly for 
the developing of arthritis in children. 
Anecdotal Evidence (for Defendant). [The witness] presents the case histories of three boys who are the 
same age as [the plaintiff] and have lived in [the plaintiff’s] neighborhood for as long as he has. None 
of them has ever had any signs of arthritis, or any other abnormal health problems. Each of the three 
boys appears in court to testify that he has the same water supply and drinks a normal amount of water. 
The witness has examined the boys and testifi es that none of them has any symptoms of arthritis. He 
concludes that arthritis is not caused by environmental factors like lead poisoning. 
Experimental Evidence (for Defendant). [The witness] compared two groups of young rats, 100 rats per 
group: one that was given water containing more lead than the EPA’s acceptable level, and one that was 
given water with a normal amount of lead. The number of rats in the two groups that developed arthritis 
was exactly the same, fi ve rats in both groups. Based on his fi ndings, the witness concludes that arthri-
tis is not caused by environmental factors like lead poisoning. 
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Procedure 
Participants were assigned randomly to one of the eight conditions. The written instruc-
tions informed them that the experiment’s purpose was to address how people make de-
cisions about legal liability and defi ned important terminology (e.g. the preponderance of 
the evidence standard, compensatory damages, etc.). They were also told “to determine the 
facts solely from the evidence presented in the case. This evidence will consist of testimo-
ny by experts.” 
After reading the trial summary, participants gave a verdict; an estimate of the proba-
bility that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury (on a 0–100 scale); and a compensa-
tion award, if they fi rst found the defendant liable. To provide a rough proxy of each ex-
pert’s credibility, participants also responded to three questions assessing their perception 
of each expert witness’s testimony (e.g. “How important was the expert’s evidence in your 
decision?”), using seven-point Likert scales, and rated the diffi culty of each expert’s testi-
mony. Finally, participants used seven-point scales to respond to three questions designed 
to measure their general attitude toward scientifi c research: (1) “What is your overall opin-
ion (extremely negative–extremely positive) about scientists and the scientifi c process?” 
(2) “How comfortable are you (extremely uncomfortable–extremely comfortable) with the 
scientifi c process and scientifi c research results?” (3) “How comfortable are you with math 
and numbers?”. 
Participants completed the questionnaire individually, with up to 10 participants in a sin-
gle session. The entire procedure took 20–30 minutes to complete. 
Results 
Liability Judgments 
The two measures of liability were participants’ dichotomous verdicts and their estimates 
of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury (see Table 2). Partici-
pants’ verdicts were regressed onto the variables of Plaintiff’s Sample Size, Incidence in 
Plaintiff’s Sample, and Defense Expert Type in a logistic regression model; causality rat-
ings were used as the dependent measure in a three-way ANOVA. 
Participants were more likely to fi nd the defendant liable when his expert presented ex-
perimental evidence (59% liable verdicts) than when he presented anecdotal evidence 
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(32% liable verdicts), B = 0.61, SE = 0.18, p < 0.001. This effect was qualifi ed by a signif-
icant Defense Expert Type × Incidence interaction, B = 0.50, SE = 0.18, p < 0.005, indicat-
ing that the effect of Expert Type was greater when the incidence in the plaintiff’s sample 
was high (74% liable verdicts in the experimental condition vs 24% in the anecdotal con-
dition) than when it was low (45% and 39%, respectively). 
Analyses of the causality ratings yielded similar results. Participants rated the defen-
dant as more likely to have caused the plaintiff’s injury when the defendant’s expert wit-
ness presented experimental evidence (mean (M) = 52.83, SD = 24.6) than anecdotal evi-
dence (M = 39.84, SD = 22.2), F(1, 144) = 12.04, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.077; in other words, the 
defendant’s expert had a greater impact when presenting anecdotal evidence. Mirroring the 
verdict data, this effect was especially pronounced when the incidence of arthritis in the 
plaintiff’s expert’s sample was high, as indicated by a signifi cant interaction between De-
fense Expert Type and Incidence, F(1, 144) = 7.12, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.047. 
Compensation Awards 
Compensation was analyzed only for participants who fi rst found the defendant liable (n = 
69), resulting in cell sizes that ranged from 4 to 13 across the eight conditions. None of the 
variables had a signifi cant effect on how much compensation was awarded to the plaintiff, Fs 
< 1.7 (the result was the same whether analyzing raw or logarithmically transformed values). 
Perception of Expert Witnesses 
Responses to the three credibility questions were highly intercorrelated, so they were av-
eraged to create a single credibility index (cf. Brekke et al., 1991), which ranged from 1 to 
7 (α = 0.71 for the plaintiff’s expert and 0.70 for the defendant’s expert). Credibility rat-
ings for the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s experts were not signifi cantly correlated, r = – 
0.13, p > 0.1; consequently, participants’ perceptions of the testimony offered by each ex-
pert were analyzed separately, as a function of Plaintiff’s Sample Size, Incidence in Plain-
tiff’s Sample, and Defense Expert Type. 
When the defendant’s expert presented anecdotal evidence, he was perceived as more 
credible (M = 5.20, SD = 1.11), F(1, 144) = 5.27, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.035, and marginally less 
diffi cult to understand (M = 1.88, SD = 1.03), F(1, 144) = 3.21, p = 0.075, η2 = 0.022, than 
when the expert presented experimental evidence (credibility: M = 4.79, SD = 1.13; diffi -
culty: M = 2.21, SD = 1.26). There was also a signifi cant interaction between Plaintiff’s 
Sample Size and Incidence in the Plaintiff’s Sample on ratings of the defendant’s expert’s 
credibility, F(1, 144) = 5.04, p < 0.05, η2 =  0.034. Post hoc comparisons showed that when 
the plaintiff’s expert’s evidence dealt with a relatively large sample, the defendant’s expert 
was perceived as more credible for low incidence (M =5.32, SD = 0.90) than for high inci-
dence (M = 4.79, SD = 1.13) testimony, t(74) = 2.82, p < 0.05, d = 0.66. There was no ef-
fect of incidence in the small sample condition, t(74) < 1. In other words, when there were 
relatively few incidents in the plaintiff’s expert’s research of similar injuries, the defen-
dant’s expert was perceived as more credible than when there were relatively many inci-
dents, but only if the plaintiff’s expert’s research involved a large sample. 
Compared to experimental evidence, anecdotal evidence presented by the defense made 
the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony seem correspondingly less credible (Ms = 4.53 vs 4.94), 
F(1, 144) = 4.98, p < 0.05, η2 =  0.033. This main effect was qualifi ed by a signifi cant in-
teraction between Defense Expert Type and Incidence in the Plaintiff’s Expert’s Sample, 
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F(1, 144) = 5.41, p < 0.05, η2 =  0.036. As with the liability judgments, there was an ef-
fect of Expert Type when Incidence was high, t(74) = 3.77, p < 0.001, d = 0.88, such that 
the plaintiff’s expert seemed more credible when the defense expert presented experimen-
tal (M = 5.22, SD = 0.93) than anecdotal evidence (M = 4.38, SD = 1.01). There was no ef-
fect of Defense Expert Type when Incidence was low, t(74) < 1. Finally, the plaintiff’s ex-
pert’s testimony was perceived as signifi cantly easier to understand when it dealt with a 
large sample (M = 1.87, SD = 1.04) than when the sample size was small (M = 2.24, SD = 
1.18), F(1, 144) = 4.13, p < 0.05, η2 =  0.028. 
The relationship between participants’ liability judgments and their perceptions of the 
experts was assessed in two ways: by comparing credibility ratings for participants who 
did or did not fi nd the defendant liable, and by computing correlations between partici-
pants’ credibility and causality ratings. Participants who found the defendant liable per-
ceived the plaintiff’s expert as more credible, t(150) = 11.43, p < 0.001, d = 1.87, and the 
defendant’s expert as correspondingly less credible, t(150) = 5.73, p < 0.001, d = 0.94, 
than participants who did not fi nd the defendant liable. The correlational analyses yield-
ed the same pattern of fi ndings: there was a positive correlation between participants’ judg-
ments of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury and their percep-
tion of the plaintiff’s expert’s credibility, r = 0.63, p < 0.001, while there was a negative 
correlation between participants’ causality ratings and the perceived credibility of the de-
fendant’s expert, r = – 0.39, p < 0.001. 
Scientifi c Attitudes 
Responses to the three questions that assessed participants’ general attitude toward the sci-
entifi c process were signifi cantly intercorrelated, so they were summed to form a single Sci-
entifi c Attitude index (with higher scores indicating a more positive attitude toward scientif-
ic research in general). Scores on this index had a mean of 15.81 (SD = 2.72; α = 0.61). 
In order to assess the relationship between participants’ attitudes toward science and 
their liability judgments, participants’ Scientifi c Attitude scores were compared for those 
who found the defendant liable and those who did not. Participants’ Scientifi c Attitude 
scores did not differ as a function of their verdict, t(149) = 1.37, p =  0.1, nor did they cor-
relate signifi cantly with participants’ estimates that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s in-
jury, r = – 0.11. Participants with a more positive scientifi c attitude perceived the defen-
dant’s expert as more credible, r = 0.26, p < 0.001, but Scientifi c Attitude was not signifi -
cantly correlated with either perceptions of the plaintiff’s expert’s credibility, r = 0.04, or 
the perceived diffi culty of either expert’s testimony, – 0.1 < rs < 0. 
Discussion 
The two main hypotheses for experiment 1 were supported: fi rst, the type of scientifi c ex-
pert testimony affected participants’ liability judgments, with judgments more favorable to 
the defendant when his expert’s testimony was anecdotal than when it was experimental. 
This advantage for anecdotal over experimental evidence is consistent with research show-
ing that psychological expert testimony is more infl uential when it deals with salient, indi-
vidual cases than with abstract research fi ndings (Schuller, 1992; Gabora et al., 1993; Ko-
vera et al., 1994, 1997; Krauss and Sales, 2001). It is also consistent with more general de-
cision-making research, indicating that people tend to underutilize base rates relative to 
more salient, individuating information (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). 
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Second, variations in the statistical expert testimony failed to affect participants’ liabil-
ity judgments. Specifi cally, their verdicts and causality judgments were largely uninfl u-
enced by either the size of the expert’s sample or the incidence in the sample of the target 
characteristic (i.e. childhood arthritis). This insensitivity to sample characteristics in expert 
testimony is consistent with research showing that people are insensitive to sampling vari-
ables in nonlegal contexts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Mock jurors may be sensitive 
to overt variations in the probative value, or conclusiveness, of statistical testimony (Smith 
et al., 1996; Koehler, 2001), but they appear to be less responsive to more subtle manipula-
tions that hold the testimony’s stated conclusiveness constant while varying the quality of 
the evidence on which that testimony is based (Kovera et al., 1999). 
Although the same observation of a low-frequency event is statistically more reliable 
as sample size and event incidence increase, participants in the present study were not re-
sponsive to such variations. In order to keep the testimony’s conclusiveness roughly equal 
across conditions, the manipulations of the statistician’s evidence were relatively subtle: a 
10- fold difference in sample size and a fi ve-fold difference in incidence rate, while the ra-
tio of arthritis in the exposed to the unexposed groups was held constant at 3:1. It is likely 
that participants would have been more responsive to variations in the magnitude of the ef-
fect leading to the expert’s conclusion (e.g. Koehler, 2001, experiment 3). 
Finally, mock jurors’ attitudes toward science in general were correlated with their per-
ceptions of one, but not both, experts, and they were not predictive of their verdicts. This 
fi nding suggests that overall attitudes toward the scientifi c process might be too abstract a 
construct to be of much use in predicting mock jurors’ verdicts in a specifi c case involving 
scientifi c evidence. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The major fi nding of experiment 1 was that mock jurors were infl uenced more by the de-
fendant’s expert when he presented anecdotal evidence than when he presented experi-
mental evidence. However, the type of expert testimony for the defense was confound-
ed with the expert witness’s credentials. The trial summary described the expert wit-
ness who presented anecdotal evidence as “a doctor”, while it described the expert who 
presented experimental evidence simply as “a scientist.” As expert witnesses’ credibili-
ty varies depending on their discipline (Saks and Wissler, 1984) as well as their creden-
tials (e.g. Bank and Poythress, 1982; Cooper et al., 1996), it is possible that anecdotal 
evidence exerted a greater effect than experimental evidence because of who the expert 
was rather than what the expert said. The primary aim of experiment 2 was to compare 
anecdotal and experimental evidence while controlling for the expert’s identity and cre-
dentials. In addition, although experiment 1 compared anecdotal and experimental ex-
pert testimony to each other, it did not assess the overall effectiveness of either testimo-
ny type. Thus, experiment 2 also includes a control condition with no expert testimony 
on behalf of the defense. 
In light of the failure of participants’ general attitudes toward science to predict their 
verdicts, a secondary aim of experiment 2 was to explore further potential individual dif-
ference variables that might predict mock jurors’ receptivity to scientifi c testimony. Rath-
er than relying on intuitive, face valid measures like those used in experiment 1, two mea-
sures with known psychometric properties were chosen: Need for Cognition (NFC; Ca-
cioppo et al., 1996) and Preference for Numerical Information (PNI; Viswanathan, 1993). 
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The NFC scale measures individual differences in “people’s tendency to engage in and 
enjoy effortful cognitive activity” (Cacioppo et al., 1996, p. 197) and is positively correlat-
ed with open-mindedness and general intelligence. Four previous studies have addressed 
the relationship between NFC and potential jurors’ decisions. Graziano et al. (1990) found 
that NFC was related to how mock jurors reasoned their way to a verdict (e.g. number and 
type of reasons listed) in a case concerning unlawful transportation of a stolen car across 
state lines, although it did not predict their ultimate verdicts. Lassiter et al. (1992), while 
not conducting a simulated trial, found nonetheless that participants high in NFC judged 
a criminal suspect who made a questionable confession as having a greater likelihood of 
guilt than did participants low in NFC. DeWitt et al. (1997) also found an association be-
tween NFC and mock jurors’ verdicts, with high-NFC mock jurors being more defense-
oriented in a civil “brainwashing” case. Thus, there is some indication that NFC can pre-
dict jurors’ response to trial evidence. The relationship between NFC and jurors’ judgments 
should be even greater in cases where the evidence is high in cognitive complexity, such as 
those relying substantially on expert testimony (McAuliff et al., 2003). Indeed, McAuliff 
and Kovera (2001) found that mock jurors high and low in NFC differed in their sensitivi-
ty to variations in some aspects of expert testimony, although they were equally insensitive 
to other evidentiary manipulations (see also DeWitt et al., 1997). 
Viswanathan (1993), p. 749) defi nes PNI as “a preference or proclivity toward using 
numerical information and engaging in thinking involving numerical information.” Not 
surprisingly, PNI and NFC are positively correlated (r = 0.30; Viswanathan, 1993; study 
7); however, PNI is a more specifi c construct, in that it taps individuals’ tendency to en-
joy thinking about one type of information (i.e. numbers) rather than thinking in general 
(Viswanathan, 1993). Because scientifi c evidence, especially when it involves experimen-
tal or epidemiological fi ndings, is heavily numerically based, this measure was included in 
the present study as well. It was predicted that participants high in NFC or PNI would be 
more responsive to the experimental evidence, and less responsive to the less probative an-
ecdotal evidence, than those low in NFC or PNI. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 141 undergraduates (80.6% female) enrolled in psychology courses who 
received extra course credit. Only one participant had previously served on a jury, while 
nine participants had taken part in a trial in some other capacity (e.g. litigant or witness). 
Materials and Design 
The same basic trial scenario was used as in experiment 1. Expert testimony was again 
presented on behalf of the plaintiff by a statistician, who described the results of an epide-
miological comparison (the small sample-low incidence condition from experiment 1). The 
expert testimony presented on behalf of the defendant varied two factors: the presence/ab-
sence of anecdotal evidence, and the presence/absence of experimental evidence. When 
the expert presented anecdotal evidence, he testifi ed that he had examined three boys who 
were exposed to the same water supply as the plaintiff, none of whom had developed ar-
thritis. When the expert presented experimental evidence, he described the results of an an-
imal study. In all conditions where an expert witness testifi ed for the defense, he was de-
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scribed as an MD, from the same university as the plaintiff’s expert, whose research led 
him to conclude that lead poisoning did not cause arthritis. The overall design was there-
fore a 2 × 2 between-groups design that varied the content of the defense expert’s testimo-
ny based on whether each of two types of evidence (anecdotal and experimental) was pres-
ent. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions, with 33–37 partic-
ipants per cell. 
The procedure and main dependent variables were the same as those used in experiment 
1. The only change was that instead of asking participants their attitudes toward science, 
they completed a “Personality Questionnaire” containing the short form of the Need for 
Cognition Scale (18 items; Cacioppo et al., 1984) and the PNI (20 items), with items from 
the two scales mixed together randomly. Participants rated their agreement/disagreement 
with each item on a nine-point scale. 
Results 
Liability Judgments 
The two measures of liability were participants’ dichotomous verdicts and their estimates 
of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury (see Table 3). For the ver-
dict data, participants’ verdicts were regressed onto the variables of Anecdotal Evidence 
(present/ absent) and Experimental Evidence (present/absent). Participants were signifi -
cantly less likely to fi nd the defendant liable when he presented anecdotal evidence (47.1% 
liable verdicts) than when he did not (67.1%, B = 0.83, p < 0.05. Whether or not the defen-
dant presented experimental evidence exerted no effect on participants’ verdicts, B = 0.04, 
p > 0.5. 
Participants’ estimates of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s inju-
ry were similar to their verdicts: they gave the defendant somewhat lower causality ratings 
when he presented anecdotal evidence (M = 48.3, SD = 25.1) than when he did not (M = 
55.6, SD = 25.4), F(1, 137) = 2.91, p = 0.09, η2 =  0.021. Neither the effect of Experimental 
Evidence nor the interaction was signifi cant, Fs < 1. 
Compensation Awards 
Compensation was analyzed only for participants who fi rst found the defendant liable (n 
= 81), resulting in cell sizes that ranged from 15 to 25 across the four conditions. Neither 
variable exerted an effect on compensation awards, Fs < 1 (the result was the same wheth-
er analyzing raw or logarithmically transformed values). 
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Perceptions of Expert Testimony 
Participants’ perceptions of the testimony offered by the two experts were analyzed sep-
arately, for both their overall credibility (again an index variable averaging responses to 
three questions) and perceived diffi culty of the testimony. Neither variable affected per-
ceptions of the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, Fs(1,137) < 3.58, ps > 0.05. 
As participants did not evaluate the defendant’s expert’s testimony in the condition 
where no expert testifi ed for the defense, perceptions of the defendant’s expert were an-
alyzed by a one-way ANOVA with three conditions (anecdotal evidence only, experimen-
tal evidence only, and anecdotal and experimental evidence together). Participants’ percep-
tions of the defense expert’s overall credibility varied as a function of testimony type, F(2, 
101) = 3.33, p < 0.05, η2 =  0.062. Tukey post hoc comparisons indicated that the defen-
dant’s expert was perceived as more credible when he presented both types of testimony 
(M = 5.19, SD = 1.02) than when he presented only experimental evidence (M = 4.55, SD 
= 0.97), p < 0.05. The mean rating when the defendant’s expert presented only anecdot-
al evidence was intermediate (M = 4.98, SD = 1.16) and did not differ from the other two 
conditions. The perceived diffi culty of the defense expert’s testimony did not vary depend-
ing on the type of testimony presented, F(2, 101) = 0.48. 
The relationship between participants’ perceptions of the expert witnesses and their lia-
bility judgments was assessed by comparing the credibility ratings of participants who did 
or did not fi nd the defendant liable, and by correlating participants’ credibility ratings with 
their causality judgments. As in experiment 1, participants who found the defendant liable 
perceived the plaintiff’s expert as more credible than participants who found for the defen-
dant (Ms = 5.68 vs 4.38), t (139) = 8.70, p < 0.001, d = 1.48. Conversely, participants who 
found the defendant liable perceived the defendant’s expert as signifi cantly less credible 
than participants who found in favor of the defendant (Ms = 4.59 vs 5.28), t(102) = 3.41, 
p < 0.001, d = 0.68. Similarly, participants’ estimates of the probability that the defendant 
caused the plaintiff’s injury were positively correlated with ratings of the plaintiff’s ex-
pert’s credibility, r = 0.57, p < 0.001, but somewhat negatively correlated with ratings of 
the defendant’s expert’s credibility, r = – 0.14, p > 0.1. 
Personality Variables 
NFC and PNI scores did not differ for participants who did and did not fi nd the defendant 
liable, ts(139) < 1. Correlations were also computed between NFC, PNI, and participants’ 
causality ratings and perceptions of the expert witnesses. NFC and PNI were positively 
correlated with each other, r = 0.40, p < 0.001. However, the two personality measures 
were largely uncorrelated with participants’ judgments and perceptions. NFC was nega-
tively correlated with the plaintiff’s expert’s perceived credibility, r = – 0.19, p < 0.05, but 
otherwise NFC and PNI were not signifi cantly correlated with participants’ perceptions or 
their causality ratings, – 0.10 < rs < 0.06, ps > 0.2. 
To assess whether the personality variables interacted with the experimental manipula-
tions, participants were categorized as high or low on NFC and PNI (by median split), and 
the principal analyses were rerun including these factors. NFC interacted with Anecdot-
al Evidence on participants’ causality judgments, F(1, 130) = 4.62, p < 0.05. Participants 
high in NFC were uninfl uenced by whether the defense expert did (M = 54.54, SD = 21.96) 
or did not (M = 52.65, SD = 27.02) present anecdotal evidence; whereas participants low 
in NFC judged the defendant as less likely to have caused the plaintiff’s injury when his 
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expert did present anecdotal evidence (M = 44.24, SD = 26.37) than when he did not (M = 
60.47, SD = 22.51). There were no other signifi cant effects involving NFC, aside from an 
uninterpretable three-way interaction on causality ratings and perception of the plaintiff’s 
expert, Fs(1, 130) > 5.4, ps < 0.05. 
The only signifi cant effect involving PNI was an interaction with Experimental Ev-
idence on participants’ causality ratings, F(1, 131) = 5.66, p < 0.05. Participants high 
in PNI judged the defendant as more likely to have caused the plaintiff’s injury when 
his expert did not present experimental evidence (Ms = 56.16 absent vs 43.59 present), 
whereas participants low in PNI judged the defendant as more likely to have caused the 
plaintiff’s injury when his expert did present experimental evidence (Ms = 57.97 present 
vs 49.30 absent). 
Discussion 
The major fi nding of experiment 2 was that there was a sizable impact on mock jurors’ li-
ability judgments of anecdotal expert testimony. In addition, the effectiveness of anecdotal 
evidence was the same whether or not it was accompanied by testimony about experimen-
tal research on animals. The effect of experimental fi ndings alone was no different from a 
control condition lacking any expert testimony for the defendant. These fi ndings suggest 
that, as with expert psychological testimony (Schuller, 1992; Gabora et al., 1993; Kovera 
et al., 1994), non-psychological experts are also more infl uential when presenting concrete 
cases than when summarizing general research fi ndings. 
As in experiment 1, there was a strong relationship between the experts’ perceived 
credibility and participants’ liability judgments. Across all types of experts, participants 
who reached a verdict for the plaintiff perceived the plaintiff’s expert as more credible, 
and the defendant’s expert as correspondingly less credible, than participants who found 
for the defendant. Thus, their verdicts were consistent with their evaluation of the evi-
dence formally presented at trial. There was also some indication that the amount of ev-
idence presented by the defense expert affected his credibility, in that participants per-
ceived him to be most credible when he presented both anecdotal and experimental ev-
idence. However, he was no more credible in this condition than when presenting anec-
dotal evidence alone. 
As in previous research (e.g. McAuliff and Kovera, 2001), there was little direct rela-
tionship between personality variables relating to individuals’ predilection for complex in-
formation (NFC and PNI) and their judgments. The inability of the present measures to 
predict mock jurors’ judgments is consistent with other research showing that despite a 
couple of notable exceptions (e.g. authoritarianism, death penalty attitudes), there is lit-
tle correlation between personality attributes and jurors’ verdicts (e.g. Kaplan, 1982; Fule-
ro and Penrod, 1990). However, there was some evidence that the personality variables 
employed in the present study were important moderators. Specifi cally, low-NFC (but not 
high-NFC) participants’ causality ratings were infl uenced by the presence or absence of 
anecdotal evidence. Similarly, the presence of experimental evidence had a positive infl u-
ence on high-PNI participants (i.e. it moved them in the direction of the side presenting 
that evidence), but a negative infl uence on low-PNI participants (i.e. it moved them away 
from the side presenting that evidence). Thus, consistent with the fi ndings of McAuliff and 
Kovera (2001), mock jurors’ attitudes toward complex information have an effect on how 
they process various aspects of expert testimony. 
442                                          BORNSTEIN IN PSYCHOLOGY, CRIME AND LAW 10 (2004)
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present fi ndings support previous research (e.g. Thompson and Schumann, 1987; 
Smith et al., 1996) showing that mock jurors respond to variations in the expert testimony 
presented in a simulated trial. Expert psychological testimony about specifi c instances has 
a greater effect on mock jurors’ judgments than testimony about general research fi ndings 
(Schuller, 1992; Gabora et al., 1993; Kovera et al., 1997; Krauss and Sales, 2001), and this 
effect generalizes to non-psychological expert testimony as well. Different types of expert 
testimony can have a profound effect on jurors’ judgments, especially when the expert tes-
timony is central to the case (cf. Brekke et al., 1991). However, the variable effects of dif-
ferent types of expert testimony are not necessarily normative. Participants in the present 
experiments were non-normative in giving greater weight to anecdotal evidence based on a 
very small sample than to experimental fi ndings based on much larger samples in both ex-
periments. 
Given the rarity of the plaintiff’s illness in the present simulation, it should hardly be 
surprising —or very informative—that the defendant in such a case could fi nd individu-
als similar to the plaintiff who did not develop adverse health effects (it would only be sur-
prising if he could not fi nd such individuals). An argument can therefore be made that the 
defense expert’s anecdotal testimony was virtually worthless with respect to its probative 
value, yet it nevertheless exerted a greater effect than the scientifi cally more probative ex-
perimental evidence. Despite the adoption by many jurisdictions of the somewhat more 
stringent Daubert standard, clinical opinion expert testimony, like the anecdotal evidence 
presented here, is often held to a lower standard (Krauss and Sales, 2001), and examples 
of “junk science” in the courtroom abound (Huber, 1991). Thus, although one might hope 
that probatively worthless anecdotal expert testimony would not be admissible in the fi rst 
place, such a hope is unlikely to be realized any time soon (Faigman, 2000). 
Participants also perceived experts presenting anecdotal evidence as more credible than 
experts presenting non-anecdotal evidence. Of course, the content of the message is only 
one factor in determining the effectiveness of expert testimony (McAuliff et al., 2003); 
characteristics of the source play a part as well (Bank and Poythress, 1982) and become 
particularly infl uential as the complexity of the expert testimony increases (Cooper et al., 
1996). Variations in experts’ status may explain why different types of experts vary in 
terms of their perceived honesty and competence (Saks and Wissler, 1984). Although the 
type of expert (i.e. the expert’s credentials) was confounded with the nature of the expert’s 
testimony in experiment 1, experiment 2 controlled for the expert’s identity and still found 
a stronger effect of anecdotal compared to experimental evidence. 
There are several possible explanations for why jurors tend to weigh anecdotal expert 
testimony more heavily than general research fi ndings. First, they may not understand the 
more abstract research. The present experiments did not assess participants’ comprehen-
sion directly. However, there was only a marginally signifi cant tendency in one of two ex-
periments for participants to perceive anecdotal evidence as easier to understand than ex-
perimental evidence. Although mock jurors’ perception of evidence diffi culty does not nec-
essarily refl ect how well they actually understood it, this fi nding suggests that they do not 
invariably experience general research fi ndings as hard to comprehend. 
A second reason for jurors’ underutilization of general research fi ndings may be that 
people harbor a mistrust of scientifi c research (Saks, 1992). The increasing use of expert 
testimony and changing standards for its admissibility have been accompanied by a grow-
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ing awareness that scientifi c methods are not infallible (Faigman, 1995, 1999). This skep-
ticism might lead jurors to give scientifi c testimony less weight than it deserves, especially 
when that testimony is relatively abstract. However, participants’ judgments were largely 
uncorrelated with their attitudes toward the scientifi c process, need for cognition, or pref-
erence for numerical information, suggesting that this explanation is also not wholly sat-
isfactory. Instead, consistent with previous research (e.g. Graziano et al., 1990; DeWitt et 
al., 1997; McAuliff and Kovera, 2001), participants’ attitudes appeared to be associated, 
to some extent, with how they interpreted different kinds of expert testimony in evaluating 
the main fact-in-issue, whether the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury. This raises the 
possibility that evidence-specifi c attitudes, as well as case-specifi c attitudes (Moran et al., 
1994), are capable of infl uencing jurors’ verdicts. 
It is likely that inasmuch as the participants were college students, their scores on the 
attitudinal measures were higher, and had a more restricted range, than would be true of 
the population as a whole. Although jury simulation research has detected little difference 
between the performance of student mock jurors and more diverse samples (Bornstein, 
1999), differences confounded with student status—such as NFC and PNI—seem espe-
cially relevant to how jurors would process complex information in cases turning on ex-
pert testimony. Thus, research employing more ecologically valid samples is called for be-
fore ruling out the possibility that attitudes toward science and complex information can 
predict jurors’ verdicts in complex cases. 
A third interpretation of the differential effectiveness of anecdotal versus general ex-
pert testimony is to view it as a demonstration within the trial context of the base-rate 
fallacy, according to which people are infl uenced more by salient, individual cases than 
by base rates drawn from larger samples (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Koehler, 1996). 
People tend not to rely suffi ciently on base rates because of the diffi culty in generaliz-
ing from abstract background information to specifi c, concrete cases (Borgida and Brekke, 
1981). Conversely, anecdotal evidence, by nature, tends to be more elaborate, vivid, and 
salient than base-rate information. Vivid information presented at trial may receive more 
weight than relatively pallid information for a number of reasons, such as greater attention 
or memorability (Bell and Loftus, 1985). These effects are magnifi ed under conditions of 
high overall information complexity (Wilson et al., 1989), which characterizes most trials, 
especially those involving expert testimony. This interpretation is consistent with research 
indicating that expert psychological testimony that specifi cally links research fi ndings to 
the case at hand is more effective than testimony that merely summarizes the relevant re-
search (Schuller, 1992; Gabora et al., 1993; Kovera et al., 1997). General expert testimo-
ny, such as base-rate evidence, fails to prove or disprove the “causal nexus” with regard to 
the individual plaintiff (Cecil et al., 1991). 
One fi nal explanation of the present fi ndings is that the anecdotal evidence might have 
been perceived as more relevant because of essential differences between the subjects of 
the anecdotal and experimental testimony. For example, the anecdotal testimony in the 
present trial simulation described boys of the same age as the plaintiff, whose health sta-
tus would likely be perceived as more relevant to the case at hand than the animals de-
scribed in the experimental testimony, by virtue of their greater similarity to the plaintiff 
(i.e. demonstrat ing the “representativeness” bias; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The an-
ecdotal evidence might also have been perceived as more relevant because of the subjects’ 
greater physical proximity to the plaintiff—that is, boys from the same neighborhood—
than animals in a laboratory environment many miles away. 
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Such confounds are an inherent limitation in studies that strive to be ecologically valid, 
and future research should, to the extent possible, manipulate these variables orthogonal-
ly in order to tease apart their effects. However, it is in the nature of anecdotal and exper-
imental evidence that they will inevitably differ in these and other respects, owing to the 
fact that anecdotal evidence based on non-human animals would likely fail to exceed the 
relevance threshold, while ethical considerations preclude rigorous experimental work ex-
posing humans to high levels of lead or other potentially toxic substances. The courts are 
often reluctant to admit expert testimony based solely on animal studies. For example, in 
dismissing the claims of Agent Orange plaintiffs, a federal court held that “animal studies 
are not helpful in the instant case because they involve different biological species. They 
are of so little probative value and are so potentially misleading as to be inadmissible” (In 
re “Agent Orange”, 1985; see Green, 1992). Nonetheless, the scientifi c and medical com-
munities view animal studies as extremely relevant to health issues in humans, and they 
are a frequent element of scientifi c testimony in various types of trials (Faigman et al., 
1997; Faigman, 1999). Future research should investigate ways of making such testimo-
ny, as well as other forms of abstract (e.g. epidemiological) expert testimony, more palat-
able to jurors. 
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